The Covid Inquiry has missed vital lessons on how to make better decisions

We have not learnt much that is new from the inquiry’s Module Two report.


It would be hard to claim that the 800-page report from the second module of the Covid Inquiry lacked weight or detail. Baroness Hallett’s findings are lengthy, and her chronology – especially of the early part of the pandemic – is thorough. But we have not learnt much that is new, say Alex Thomas and Rebecca McKee

The inquiry has missed the opportunity to really dig into how decisions were made in the heart of government throughout 2020 and 2021. That means that while the recommendations, as far as they go, are considered and sensible, the lessons identified are either limited and specific, so easy to dismiss, or too generic to be useful for future decision makers

There is more to learn about how decisions were really made during the pandemic

Alex Thomas gave oral and written evidence, and IfG analysis is reflected in the ‘government decision-making’ part of the report.1 The decision making and governance sections of the report rightly criticised the structure of some of the ministerial groups and cabinet committees used during the pandemic. The lack of full cabinet involvement was noted and criticised.

These conclusions are welcome, but the inquiry had on its hands a much richer evidence base than previous analyses of Covid decision making, and its failure to take advantage of this is reflected in the report too. The inquiry had access to contemporaneous submissions, which will have formed the real basis for decision making in the centre of government, but the report takes little from them.

Where is the analysis of actual decision making submissions and crucial meetings? What more do we know – or should we know – about the detailed organisational structures inside No.10 and the Cabinet Office, structures that were so hard to understand from the outside?

Those looking for more granular detail of lessons from actual decisions that were made, or not made, or how the Cabinet Office and the rest of government made mistakes and rectified them, are left dissatisfied. This frustration is particularly acute for those in government who have been waiting for the recommendations to be published, because internal lesson learning has been put on hold in anticipation of the findings of the inquiry.

A different approach to evidence gathering would have revealed more useful insights

Part of the problem is that while statutory inquiries can take different approaches to evidence gathering and witness questioning, the pressure to get going quickly, and the lack of best practice sharing between inquiries, means they can default to a legalistic courtroom style. Module two of the Covid Inquiry certainly did.

It would have been better for the inquiry to draw more deeply on the experience of a wider range of officials working on the pandemic response. Some of the responsibility for that gap rests with ministers and civil servants who could have done more to facilitate the inquiry’s work. But the inquiry needed to change its approach too. Evidence need not have always been given antagonistically in public through cross examination. For more junior civil servants, or those for whom there was no need to submit to a grilling on the witness box, private sessions could have been arranged. Those could have been set up with the explicit objective of reflecting on what happened without blame and focused on learning administrative lessons for the future. Unfortunately, that knowledge and opportunity for learning now risks being lost.

In fact, the approach the inquiry has adopted for module ten (which is focused on the impact of the pandemic on society) would have helped. The module includes a set of roundtable discussions with various groups, including those in the justice system, hospitality and cultural institutions.2 The inquiry plans to publish evidence reports for each, rather than providing full transcripts of discussions. This should lead to a more comprehensive understanding of the issues and better insights from which to learn.

Inquiries must embed policy experts in their work

Statutory inquiries are widely regarded as the gold standard of investigation into matters of public concern. That is against a backdrop of generally low public trust in government, and strained relationships between authorities and those impacted by the events. When the government or other agencies have repeatedly failed to acknowledge their role, or have been complicit in cover-ups, the independence and power to compel witnesses that statutory inquiries provide can have great value. Judges, too, bring a lot to an inquiry. Authority, impartiality and independence are essential for success.

But statutory, judge-led inquiries can become inflexible and – as we saw with the module two covid report – let the process overwhelm the desired outcome. A race to ‘lawyer up’ by inquiry teams means that they end up under-supported on the policy side. A legalistic approach leads to antagonistic and defensive witnesses. And appointing a judge as chair means that the person leading the inquiry will normally then have less direct experience of the structures that have failed and how government really works. Statutory inquiries need to take more advantage of the flexibility they have to vary their approach, and if the objective is to reach policy recommendations, then policy experts need to be much more closely involved.

The Covid Inquiry was set up with the best of intentions and has done valuable work. It is enormously to Baroness Hallett’s credit that the Covid victims and their families welcomed the module two report as a moment of accountability. That is an important function for any public inquiry. But unfortunately, the report should not be taken as the final word on decision-making during such a crisis. It must now fall to government to ensure that work is done to ensure ministers and their advisers are better prepared to make decisions during the next pandemic.